Why are we failing in the fight against Russian propaganda?

Shortly after the landslide victory of the PAS party against the Kremlin’s proxy parties in the 2021 parliamentary elections, and especially on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian propaganda against Moldovan society has become fiercer, more affluent, and aggressive. It undermines peace in society, erodes trust in public institutions and affects the security of the Republic of Moldova. In these circumstances, the Moldovan authorities have resorted to drastic measures to reduce the effects of Russian propaganda in Moldova. At the same time, the effectiveness, legality and appropriateness of these measures are yet to be assessed.

Dmitri Gudumac

Communications Director, Soros Foundation Moldova

Democracy

17 April 2024

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Romanian version

The world has changed. If in the 18th century, Russia was able to limit access to banned literature by searching luggage at the border, and France in the 19th century censored journalists by monitoring printing presses, in the 21st century, authorities around the world are trying to use the same tools for the same purpose – limiting information, but in totally different circumstances. In the digital or information age¹, as future historians will probably call our times, information finds new forms and distribution methods, including in rather centralized² environments such as Meta or Telegram. At present, neither the administrators of these social networks have the possibility or, perhaps, the desire to limit any content effectively, nor do the authorities of countries or supranational unions have sufficient powers to oppose or effectively regulate the circulation of information.

The European Parliament notes in its resolution of 19 April 2023 on the challenges facing the Republic of Moldova 3 that our democracy has demonstrated its resilience in the face of Russian disinformation and propaganda during the recent government reshuffle and despite the intensification of Russia’s subversive activities; the people and leadership of the Republic of Moldova remain committed to the pro-European path they have chosen. In its resolution⁴of 25 November 2020, “on strengthening media freedom: protection of journalists in Europe, hate speech, disinformation and the role of platforms,” the European Parliament stressed that the spread of disinformation, as well as disproportionate action to combat it on digital platforms, is a threat to freedom of information, democratic discourse, and media independence. The ENEMO mission, which monitored the 2023 general local elections with financial support from the Soros Foundation Moldova, cited⁵ disinformation as threatening elections and the democratic process. ENEMO stresses the need for strict rules in the media, focusing on access to information of public interest and combating disinformation. ENEMO recommends the creation of regulations for online media that address misinformation and promote digital accountability.

The Republic of Moldova has long been under pressure from disinformation, misinformation, or misinformation actions; more precisely, pro-European political forces are under pressure from these covert actions from Russia—from traditional propaganda institutions and what ISW⁶ calls mouthpieces. In this article, we will not dwell on the typology of propaganda or how it affects political processes but on the actions of Moldovan and European authorities to counter Russian⁷ disinformation.

Let’s clarify the concepts with which science operates

Information Disorder: In a report⁸ by the Council of Europe, information disorder is described as the totality of information-polluting actions, broadly classified into three categories: disinformation, misinformation, and misinformation.

Misinformation is the act of transmitting false information without the intention of doing harm
Misinformation is the knowing transmission of false information to cause harm. The European External Action Service⁹ has developed a definition of disinformation more specific to current European affairs: Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI)—a pattern of behavior that threatens or has the potential to harm political values, procedures, and processes. Such activity is manipulative and is carried out in an intentional and coordinated manner. Actors of such activity may be state or non-state actors, including their representatives inside and outside their territory.
Misinformation is the deliberate misrepresentation of factual information to cause harm, often by publicly conveying information intended to remain private.¹⁰

In contrast to the above notions, the term propaganda has been known for centuries, even if it has taken on additional meanings in our information age. In general, dictionaries and literature define propaganda as a set of actions undertaken to distribute information to influence the opinion of the public or people, usually for military, political, or ideological purposes.

What the Moldovan authorities did

Max Weber, one of the most influential sociologists and political scholars, wrote in “Politics as a Vocation” ¹¹at the beginning of the 20th century that the state is based on violence, a natural mode of action. More often than not, governments worldwide, if any action is needed to stop or limit a process, act instinctively – by imposing restrictions. In other words, the authorities of the Republic of Moldova, the political authorities, and the legislative and executive powers have acted naturally – by imposing restrictions.

On 22 June 2022, the Monitorul Oficial (official gazette) published amendments 12 to the Audiovisual Media Services Code, which de facto banned the broadcasting of audiovisual television and radio programs with informational, analytical, military, or political content produced in states other than “those that have ratified the European Convention on Transfrontier Television,” targeting Russian propaganda.
On 16 December 2022, the Commission for Exceptional Situations, responsible for managing the energy resources crisis caused by Russia’s hostile actions a year earlier and with prolonged activity in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, suspended 13 the licenses of six TV stations – First in Moldova, RTR Moldova, Accent TV, NTV Moldova, TV6, Orhei TV – to protect the national information space, prevent the risk of disinformation by spreading false information or attempts to manipulate public opinion and [….] for the lack of accurate information for the coverage of national events and the war in Ukraine.
On 18 August 2023, the Monitorul Oficial published the Law 14 which reformulated the notion of disinformation in the Audiovisual Media Services Code and included sanctions for broadcasting disinformation – fines and license suspension. It should be noted that the Audiovisual Council can apply these sanctions.
On 15 September 2023, the Audiovisual Council approves the Methodology for detecting and assessing misinformation in audiovisual content 15. In 2023, the Council also applied sanctions for broadcasting Russian propaganda.
On 30 October 2023, the Commission for Exceptional Situations, for similar reasons, suspended 16 the licenses of six more TV stations: Orizont TV, ITV, Prime TV, Publika TV, Channel 2, and Channel 3. It is worth noting that hours before the decision of the Commission for Exceptional Situations, the director of the Intelligence and Security Service said¹⁷ ¹⁸ that he had proposed to suspend TV licenses because his institution had operational information and evidence that Russia was influencing the local elections [held on 5 November 2023] and undermining the democratic process. The official also said that his institution has suspicions that these TV stations are financed from obscure sources, act in concert, and distribute content previously broadcast by TV stations whose licenses were suspended in the previous round.
On 18 December 2023, the chair of the parliamentary committee on economy, budget, and finance introduced an amendment¹⁹ without any public consultations and four days before the vote in the final reading 20 of the amendments to the Law on Ensuring the Integrity and Functionality of the Electricity Market, which includes amendments to the Law on Basic Principles of Regulation of Entrepreneurial Activity and grants the Council for the Promotion of Investment Projects of National Importance the power to suspend TV licenses. Within days of the publication of the new law, on 29 December 2023, the Council “temporarily suspended” licenses previously suspended by the Commission for Exceptional Situations for “the existence of cases of investment activity with serious deviations from the provisions of the law and ignoring restrictions on making investments in areas of importance to state security.” The same statement, published on the Government’s website²¹, says that “All companies operating in the field of television broadcasting/audiovisual services will undergo a verification of their beneficial owners regarding their involvement in money laundering activities, serious or severe crimes, corruption or activities affecting state security or public order.”
The Intelligence and Security Service (SIS), in a few rounds since the outbreak of Russia’s war against Ukraine, has called for the blocking of a total of 50 websites for being a “danger to cyberspace.” Technically, the National Agency for Electronic Communications and Information Technology Regulation (ANRCETI) requires internet providers to block access to these sites and monitor whether access is blocked. At the same time, several of these sites are still available, and some continue to publish their content on other web addresses. Radio Free Europe writes that the blocking method used by the authorities (DNS-blocking) is ineffective²².
The law 23 by which the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova created the Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation was published on August 18, 2023. On January 17, 2024, the Concept for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation, Information Manipulation, and Foreign Interference for 2024-2028 was published²⁴
On 20 March 2024, the Council for the Promotion of Investment Projects of National Importance decided²⁵“to temporarily suspend the validity of any permit issued to [the company that owns the stations – n.a.] Canal 5 and Maestro FM” because, according to SIS information, they are affiliated to the Plahotniuc/Sor group. The Audiovisual Council – the authority responsible by law for the public interest in the field of audiovisual broadcasting – is not part of the composition of this Council and, according to published information, the Centre for Strategic Communication and Combating Disinformation – the authority directly responsible for combating disinformation – was not involved.

The creation of the Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation demonstrates the authorities’ intention to move from ad hoc actions to stem the flow of propaganda to a more systemic approach. When going to press, the Centre is at the stage of institutional strengthening, hiring staff, and developing the tools to fulfill its mandate.

On 12 February 2024, at the first Cybersecurity Forum, the Ministry of Economic Development and Digitisation announced the launch of two new institutions – the National Cyber Security Agency and the National Institute for Cyber Security Innovations “Cybercor.” The Government, at the proposal of the Ministry of Economic Development and Digitization, has approved a draft law amending Law 48/2023 on energy security²⁶; these amendments are necessary to comply with the European Union’s NIS Directive 27. Although the newly created Agency has no direct powers to combat propaganda, it could have a significant effect if it functions effectively. In France, a similar agency, part of the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, uncovered on 12 February 2024 a network of 193 websites called by the French authorities Portal Kombat (analogous to Mortal Kombat), spreading pro-Russian propaganda. These sites looked like news sites but were publishing disinformation about Russia’s war in Ukraine.

On March 28, 2024, several European media outlets²⁸ wrote that a major Russian propaganda network involving European politicians had been uncovered. Investigators claim the organization used the popular Voice of Europe website to pay off politicians. Czech and Polish authorities said the network was aimed at influencing European politics. Czech media, citing intelligence and security sources, reported that politicians from Germany, France, Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Hungary were paid by Voice of Europe to influence upcoming European Parliament elections. German newspaper Der Spiegel said the money was either handed over in cash at secret meetings in Prague or through cryptocurrency exchanges. Pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk is accused by the Czech Republic of being behind the network.

These are a few examples of hostile actions by either the Russian government or proxies of the government in the information environment that are within the purview of national defense/security structures.

A survey by NDI Moldova (National Democratic Institute), conducted between April and July 2023, shows that almost half of the respondents do not support the withdrawal of TV licenses (47%), and only less than a third support it (30%)²⁹. This action by the authorities has negatively affected primarily Russian speakers, ethnic minorities, pro-Russian sympathizers, and those over 55 years old. It should be noted that it is precisely these people who are the main target of Russian propaganda and, at the same time, one of the three most vulnerable demographic groups susceptible to disinformation³⁰.

Why is fighting propaganda a difficult task?

Freedom of expression³¹

Limiting the distribution of propaganda by law inherently limits the right to free speech and should, therefore, only take place when the effects are weighed, and the positive ones outweigh the negative ones. At this stage, we are faced with a lack of substantiated research demonstrating the positive impact of a possible limitation of the right to free expression or censorship of media space in favor of state security.

Respecting freedom of expression and fighting Russian propaganda in Europe is a dilemma for Western democracies. On the one hand, freedom of expression is a pillar of democratic societies, guaranteeing citizens the right to communicate ideas and opinions without fear of repression. On the other hand, in the context of geopolitical tensions and information warfare, Russian propaganda is determined to be a severe threat to the security and integrity of European democracies. Propagandists use media tools and online platforms to spread disinformation, sow discord, and undermine public trust in institutions. In this situation, European states are challenged to strike a balance between protecting freedom of expression and implementing effective measures to counter the harmful influence of propaganda through media literacy initiatives, tailored regulation, and international collaboration.

The Court of Justice of the European Union case law shows a difference between freedom of expression and freedom to disseminate propaganda. The task is to define that difference – separate dissent from propaganda. There are no established solutions yet; they have to be found and adapted to each situation – recently, the Soros Foundation Moldova published a report 32 by Professor Andrei Richter of Comenius University in Slovakia on the legislative needs of the Republic of Moldova for adequate protection against propaganda, manipulation, and disinformation. The authorities can and should use this and other Foundation initiatives to develop effective tools to fight propaganda without limiting civil liberties.

Quite rightly, a war in Europe and an avalanche of Russian propaganda actions is not an ordinary situation, a problem that requires unusual solutions. Most countries, including Moldova 33, have the instrument of establishing a state of war, curfew, or state of emergency, which allows for the temporary restriction of freedoms when the country’s security is at risk. It should be noted that the Moldovan authorities made use of this possibility when, initially, by decisions of the Commission for Exceptional Situations, they suspended 12 TV licenses and blocked dozens of websites without any judicial process, based on information from the Intelligence and Security Service, and then transferred the power to restrict TV activity to a council for the promotion of investment projects. Keeping such an instrument in the hands of the executive branch or even extending it in the long term and even normalizing its use cannot be accepted by society.

Regulation-Control

Governments have the technical ability to control the media in TV, radio, and print because they have the resources to control the distribution infrastructure, which is not true of online information – it can be stored on servers in any country and transmitted from one location to another in a very short time. The possibility of (limited) control of information in social media is held by private companies with the technical ability to monitor, censor, and analyze data effectively. However, in the case of decentralized social media, which is not yet very popular but is growing, even the companies that have developed the software and own the servers on which the information is stored can no longer control it.

The Moldovan authorities control digital terrestrial and cable TV infrastructure. Even though the authorities are trying to establish cooperation with Meta³⁴ which owns two of the most popular social media networks in the country, Facebook and Instagram, and the StopFals.md portal, which the Independent Press Association runs, is partnering in data verification 35, these efforts are not successful – on Facebook, there is still a lot of advertising running in favor of Ilan Shor, convicted in Moldova, wanted by Interpol and sanctioned by US authorities. Sorin Ioniță (Expert Forum – EFOR, Romania) published on Facebook 36, obtained from the Slovak authorities, that this social network has 35 (thirty-five) Romanian content moderators, i.e., about 1 in 800,000 Romanian speakers worldwide. Indeed, not all 28 million Romanian speakers post daily on Facebook and Instagram, but this rate is clearly insufficient.

SIS’s attempt to block Russian propaganda sources on the web has not made them impossible to access in Moldova. Still, it has forced them to migrate their content to environments not controlled by the authorities, such as Telegram or mirror sites in other jurisdictions.

There is a perception that Telegram is the primary medium for propaganda, given the anonymity and impunity enjoyed by some sources, the permissiveness of Telegram’s policies, and, in some documented cases in Russia, the Telegram administration’s collaboration with Putin’s regime³⁷. However, our data shows that Telegram is not a truly important source of information for the Moldovan public, making it relevant to a relatively narrow target group.

The mechanisms of propaganda and what the European authorities are doing

The institutions of the European Union are the main sponsors of research into the effects and methods of Russian propaganda aimed at undermining democracy in Europe. It is essential to research the techniques and effects of propaganda on a large, supranational scale because the techniques and narratives used by propagandists in one country can be transferred to another quite quickly in response to some actions of democratic institutions. Combining interdisciplinary studies, i.e., legal, psychological, and technological perspectives, can lead to effective policy measures to protect democracy, fundamental rights, and the rule of law against disinformation campaigns. Research has identified three main features, which are not unique but specific to Russian propaganda in Europe and serve to design public policy:

Disinformation via politicians³⁸. Often, Kremlin narratives³⁹ are distributed by politicians⁴⁰, usually from extreme left-wing parties: communist, Trotskyist, etc., or right-wing: nationalist and neo-Nazi. Research has shown that disinformation actions have been increasingly mixed with authentic content, making it more difficult to identify sources and separate lies from truth. In particular, when people in high political authority have disseminated misinformation and manipulative propaganda, public confidence in democratic institutions has been significantly damaged. Several Member States and third countries have introduced legislative and public policy measures to combat disinformation, while civil society action has focused on strengthening public resistance to such tactics.
Social media propaganda⁴¹. Propagandists feel quite free in the social media space because neither country’s authorities have sufficient leverage to moderate content, and the companies that own the social media platforms do not moderate them.
Linguistic and cultural similarity. A study 42 by the RAND Corporation examined Russian-language content on social media, particularly in former Soviet states such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova. Propaganda sources primarily target Russian speakers outside Russia, fuelling social tensions and xenophobia.

EU and other relevant countries’ legislation and regulations in the field of counter-propaganda

No democratic country or European Union has practical and specific laws and regulations to combat propaganda. It is largely a poorly regulated area for three reasons:

Limiting media content, if applied excessively, in bad faith, or indiscriminately, can affect the right to free expression, which is unacceptable in liberal democracies.
Lack of effective control over most propaganda media – you can’t regulate what you can’t control
There is not enough well-founded scientific research on propaganda because it is a changing phenomenon, and the social sciences, in general, need more time to study its effects. Democracies typically only make decisions to restrict freedoms in the face of imminent danger or based on convincing research.

In 2022, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union approved the Digital Services Act (DSA)⁴³ to regulate the principal online players in the EU market unifiedly. This document aims to combat disinformation by recognizing its danger and making platforms, including Facebook and Instagram, more transparent and accountable.

The Digital Services Act covers several online services, including trading platforms, social media, content-sharing platforms, app stores, and travel and accommodation platforms. Its main objective is to prevent illegal and harmful activities, including misinformation. This regulation sets out rules to protect consumers and their fundamental rights online. Specific rules apply to very large online platforms and search engines that reach more than 10% of the European population. These platforms pose particular risks regarding disseminating illegal content and societal harm. The document aims to strengthen democratic control and oversight of systemic platforms and addresses risks such as manipulation and misinformation.

Although the Digital Services Act is an important step in regulating the online environment, once the provisions come fully into force in early 2024, its impact in the fight against misinformation has yet to be assessed.

Although the United Kingdom is not a member of the European Union, the experience of this country is relevant for Moldova because this country also faced Russian influence in the elections. Still, the authorities failed to detect and counter Russian subversive actions due to the reduced instrumentation. In 2023, the UK Parliament passed the Online Safety Act 2023⁴⁴– mainly aimed at combating Russian propaganda. In 2021, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport 45 launched a literacy campaign with an annual budget of £340k (7.5m), where teachers, social workers, and librarians were trained to help young people and disabled people learn to spot propaganda.

European Council decisions are not part of the Community acquis proper and are secondary legislation; all Member States respect them. On several occasions, the European Council has sanctioned 46 several organizations and individuals involved in Russian propaganda, including Moldova.

The European Parliament has invited social media platforms to sign up to and follow a Code of Practice on misinformation⁴⁷. This code includes various commitments, from transparency in political advertising to shutting down fake accounts and demonetizing disinformation providers. Companies including Facebook, Google, Twitter (X), Microsoft, and TikTok have signed the code. However, compliance with the code is voluntary, and there are no penalties for non-compliance.

The Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled on a case related to a specific case of Russian propaganda. The Court ruled explicitly on the legality of measures to limit the spread of disinformation in a case concerning the cross-border broadcasting of political propaganda. Case C-622/17, Baltic Media Alliance v. Lietuvos radijo 48, concerning the decision of the Lithuanian Radio and Television Commission to require that NTV Mir Lithuania, a Russian-state propaganda channel targeting the Russian-speaking minority in Lithuania, be broadcast only in pay-TV packages. This distribution measure was aimed at combating the dissemination of information aimed at destabilizing the Lithuanian state, stimulating xenophobia by spreading false information about alleged neo-Nazi policies and Lithuanians’ collaboration with the Nazis during the Second World War. The Court held that such technical measures were likely to limit to some extent the accessibility of the channel in question, which was their very purpose but did not amount to the actual suspension of the channel. Given that the contested measure did not affect the retransmission of this channel, the CJEU concluded that the action of the Lithuanian authorities did not infringe European law, i.e., the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 49.

This ruling did not specifically address freedom of expression. However, freedom of reception and retransmission of audiovisual media services is a specific expression of the right to freedom of expression. The Court’s reasoning suggests that measures aimed at limiting the spread of disinformation, rather than eliminating it, are more likely to meet the proportionality test⁵⁰.

In addition, the Court of Justice of the European Union (General Court) heard a case on applying sanctions against a propagandist – Dmitry Kiseliov 51. The Court stressed the need not to prejudice the substance of the right to freedom of expression in this case concerning the adoption of restrictive measures against Kiseliov because he participates in programs containing war propaganda justifying Russian military intervention in Ukraine. The Court found that the measures taken (sanctions imposed) by the Council of the European Union against the applicant were proportionate to the objective of putting pressure on the Russian government and justified, given that the applicant had actively supported policies aimed at destabilizing Ukraine.

These decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union are part of the Community acquis and will have to be transposed into Moldovan law.

Estonia is perhaps the most successful example of digitization, but it is important to note that digitization efforts in this country have been coupled with media literacy. The example is advantageous because Estonia and Moldova face similar challenges, have a similar recent past and ethnic structure (ethnic minorities targeted by propaganda), and have fairly small human and material resources. Following the first cyber attack on Estonia⁵², which shut down the websites of government, banks, and media institutions in 2007, the country has become a leader in cyber security. Estonia strongly emphasizes education to help its citizens recognize and protect themselves from misinformation. Since 2010, Estonia’s public schools have taught students media literacy from kindergarten to high school. Students in grade 10 must also take a compulsory 35-hour course on “media and influence⁵³.” These measures have been taken to teach citizens to identify and avoid misinformation in an increasingly complex and crowded digital world. This way, Estonia aims to protect itself from future digital aggression and secure its online infrastructure against threats. The Media Literacy Index 2023⁵⁴, compiled by our colleagues at the Open Society Institute – Sofia, places Estonia among the countries with the highest media literacy level, along with Finland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Ireland, and Switzerland. Moldova is in the second half of the list, in cluster 4, together with Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey.

At the same time, the Estonian Internal Security Service (Kaitsepolitseiamet-KaPo), the counterpart of the Moldovan SIS, has for several years prosecuted several Estonian and Russian citizens residing in Estonia for non-violent actions against the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Estonia on the orders of the Russian services, based on instructions from the Russian Federation. The individuals are accused⁵⁵ of participating in activities of conscious influence to create a political organization in Estonia to promote Russia’s foreign and security policy narratives. These actions also define the activity of Russia’s agents of influence in Moldova.

On 21 February 2024, the Moldovan police detained three men who were setting fire to the cars of refugees from Ukraine settled in the Gagauz region. Although the police did not publish information about the arsonists, these events became the subject of Russian propaganda sources in Moldova. They were treated as evidence of Gagauz’s intolerance towards Ukrainian refugees.

At the end of February, the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia received a draft of local law 56, rafted by the Executive Committee, led by Evghenia Guțul, a person promoted by Ilan Shor, which, among other things, provides for the establishment of a permit regime (Izin) for the activity on the territory of Gagauzia of media institutions, including private ones; coordination with the Executive Committee of Gagauzia and reporting on the general concept and editorial policy of media institutions. Individuals and political forces affiliated with Ilan Shor are some of the leading exponents and beneficiaries of Russian propaganda in Moldova.

Finally

Actions against Russian propaganda in Moldova have varied in effectiveness and impact. Although significant efforts have been made, the results have failed to stop the flow of Russian propaganda completely and have raised concerns about the protection of civil rights, including those of ethnic minorities. The aim of these measures, to limit unfavorable external influence, is appreciated, but the methods used have raised questions about their consistency with democratic principles.

Given the current resources and capacities of prosecution authorities, there are still challenges in detecting and legally prosecuting propaganda as a crime. In this context, there is a clear call for more robust and coordinated action by all relevant institutions to protect and promote democratic principles in Moldova. In the NDI survey cited above, 29% of Moldovans expect more vigorous action from the Intelligence and Security Service in the fight against propaganda, 13% expect it from the Parliament and the Audiovisual Council, and 11% from the Cabinet of Ministers. This means that the government has the support of the society (71%⁵⁷) for stricter actions against propagandists.

Democratic practices accept accountability for acts of propaganda because the right to free speech cannot protect the promotion of military aggression, xenophobia, or authoritarian regimes. When most citizens do not trust the judiciary, the authorities must do even more to argue beyond doubt the danger of Russian propaganda. The experience of the Baltic States, which in just a few years have rapidly raised the media literacy level, may be helpful in this respect. In the Republic of Moldova, media literacy, supported over the years by civil society and donors, must become a public policy with a systematic, consistent, and serious approach. A leader coordinating these policies could become the Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation. Another aspect of countering propaganda is the adherence of our institutions to the principles of good governance 58: transparency, accountability, participation, coherence, and effectiveness. Otherwise, propagandists get those bits of truth, which, combined with untruths, make propaganda more effective. Transparency of decisions, accountability to citizens, and the fight against corruption increase public confidence in the authorities and reduce vulnerability to external narratives designed to destabilize. For example, respecting the principles of good governance in implementing the EU acquis will demonstrate Moldova’s commitment to democratic values, thus eroding the fertile ground for propaganda intended to undermine the country’s European orientation. This commitment to good governance strengthens domestic institutions. It contributes to the restructuring of politics – giving more space to pro-European forces and reducing the electoral pool of those oriented to the Putin regime.

Why are we failing in the fight against Russian propaganda? In addition to the hallmark of all democracies – protecting all rights, including those who would destroy them – we have strengthened institutions, a legal system unprepared to meet new challenges, and a society that propaganda narratives can easily influence. This situation is not unique in Europe; countries such as Ukraine, the Baltic States, and some Balkan countries face similar problems. For example, Ukraine, which is in a situation of open warfare, is fighting Russian informational influence through harsh limitations imposed by martial law, and the Baltic states have invested in media education to increase citizens’ resilience to disinformation. These efforts underline that while the challenges are similar, countering strategies can vary and be tailored to each country’s context. Strengthening democracy, protecting human rights, and ensuring press freedom are vital to this fight. By accepting restrictions on freedoms in the name of short-term security, societies risk weakening the very values they seek to protect. For cultural and historical reasons, we have not yet succeeded in building a fully open society⁵⁹ with a consolidated democracy. If we accept the violation of human rights and the curtailment of freedoms, even in the name of short-term benefits, we will not succeed.

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